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In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick’s experience machine objection to hedonism about well-
being. I then explain and brief ly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made
of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes
of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.
1. Introduction
Theories of well-being attempt to explain what it is in virtue of which lives can be good or bad
for their subjects.1 According to one such theory, hedonism, lives can be good or bad for their
subjects just in virtue of their ability to feel pleasure and pain (where ‘pain’ is shorthand for
unpleasurable experience more generally).2
Hedonism has a straightforward appeal. Many feel that something that has no effect on some-
one’s experiences does not ‘touch’ or ‘get to’ this person in the sort of way required for something
to benefit or harm her.3 If this is true, then it seems only a relatively small step to hedonism.
Nonetheless, hedonism has few contemporary advocates.4 This is mainly due to a single,
highly inf luential objection to it, widely considered to be decisive: Robert Nozick’s experience
machine. Discussions of well-being – whether in scholarly journals, academic conferences, or
university lecture halls – often begin with a quick dismissal of hedonism by reference to
Nozick’s objection before turning to ‘more interesting matters’ (usually the question of which
desire-based or hybrid theory of well-being is true).5
In this paper, I will do three things: First, reconstruct Nozick’s objection. While the objec-
tion is oft-cited, it is rarely formulated in a clear or careful way. Second, explain and brief ly
discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of Nozick’s objection.
Third, question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly dis-
poses of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.
2. The Objection
Nozick’s most famous statement of the objection appears in his early work, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia (1974). But it is his mature work, The Examined Life (1989), that contains his clearest
formulation of it. There, he writes:
Imagine a machine that could give you any experience (or sequence of experiences) you might desire.
When connected to this experience machine, you can have the experience of writing a great poem or
bringing about world peace or loving someone and being loved in return. You can experience the felt
pleasures of these things, how they feel “from the inside.”You can program your experiences for…the
rest of your life. If your imagination is impoverished, you can use the library of suggestions extracted
from biographies and enhanced by novelists and psychologists. You can live your fondest dreams “from
the inside.” Would you choose to do this for the rest of your life?…Upon entering, you will not
remember having done this; so no pleasures will get ruined by realizing they are machine-produced.6© 2016 The Author(s)
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Experience Machine 137If hedonism were true, Nozick suggests, then ‘plugging in would constitute the very best life, or
tie for being the best, because all that matters about a life is how it feels from the inside’.7
Intuitively, however, this is not so – there are alternatives that would be better for one. There-
fore, hedonism is false.
We can state Nozick’s objection simply, as follows:
(1) Plugging in would not be best for one.
(2) Hedonism entails that plugging in would be best for one.
Therefore,
(3) Hedonism is false.
In a nutshell: Hedonism entails something false, so hedonism is false.
How does Nozick argue for (1)? Some philosophers have suggested that he argues for it by
appeal to a claim about what we would want or choose to do if we were given the option of plug-
ging in, in the following sort of way:
We would not want or choose to plug in to the machine, and this makes it the case that plugging in
would not be best for us.8
Some who attribute this argument to Nozick object that nothing follows from the fact that
something is desired (or would be desired under certain conditions) when it comes to whether
it is desirable (i.e., worthy of being desired).9
Others point out that if Nozick’s objection to hedonism includes this argument, then it begs
the question against hedonism by presupposing that well-being is determined by something
other than pleasure and pain – namely, desire satisfaction and frustration.10
These worries miss the mark, however, since Nozick never intended to argue for (1) in this
way. He explicitly disavows this argument here:
Notice that I am not saying simply that since we desire connection to actuality the experience machine
is defective because it does not give us whatever we desire…for that would make “getting whatever
you desire” the primary standard. Rather, I am saying that the connection to actuality is important
whether or not we desire it—that is why we desire it—and the experience machine is inadequate
because it doesn’t give us that.11
Not only, then, is Nozick not appealing to a desire-based theory of well-being in his objec-
tion to hedonism, he intends the machine to make trouble for desire-based theories as well
(a point I will return to in Section 4).
Why, then, does Nozick ask us to consider what we would want or choose to do at all? The
most charitable answer is: merely as an intuition pump for (1). That is, he asks us to consider
whether we would want to plug in as a way of getting us to have the intuition that plugging in would
not be best for someone. Imagining oneself faced with the choice of whether to plug in, and seeing
what one would want or choose to do in this scenario, makes vivid the fact that it would not be
in the best interests of a normal human being to plug in.
What, then, is Nozick’s argument for (1)? It may be suggested that he argues for (1) by
pointing out some of the things that a person would be missing out on by plugging in – for
example, in Nozick’s words, the ability ‘to do certain things, and not just have the experience
of doing them’,12 to ‘focus on external reality, with [one’s] beliefs, evaluations, and emotions’,13
to explore ‘reality and [respond], altering it and creating new actuality ourselves’,14 and so on.© 2016 The Author(s)
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138 Experience MachineBut this suggestion, too, seems to mistake Nozick’s intention. While Nozick does indeed say
that it is for reasons such as these that plugging in would not be best for one, this is not part of
some argument that he has for (1). Instead, he seems to think that ref lection on the experience
machine case yields two distinct revelations – on the one hand, that hedonism and desire-based
theories are false, and on the other, that well-being includes something like an ability to connect
with or interact with reality.
Nozick, I believe, does not attempt to argue for (1). Instead, he takes it for granted that
most of his readers will find (1) intuitive. This has proven to be a safe assumption. Even
those sympathetic to hedonism have admitted to finding (1) intuitive.15 The genius of
Nozick’s argument lies simply in pointing out that something interesting and contested
(i.e., the falsity of hedonism) appears to follow from something that is found almost univer-
sally acceptable (i.e., (1)).
Before moving on, it is worth noting that, while the objection I have attributed to Nozick
here is the important one that has loomed so large in recent literature on well-being, not
everyone is convinced that it is Nozick’s own. The chief dissenter is Feldman (2011). Feldman
considers roughly the interpretation of Nozick I have offered and says of it: ‘Possibly an
interesting argument; definitely not in the text.’16 His reasoning is as follows:
Careful study of the passage will reveal that Nozick does not explicitly claim to be refuting any theory
of welfare or of value in general. He never mentions welfare or wellbeing or value or intrinsic value in
the passage. Instead, he speaks almost exclusively about certain psychological matters. Thus, for exam-
ple, he says (p. 43, 44) that reflection on the Experience Machine teaches us something about “what
matters to us” or what is “important to us”. In other places he suggests that it tells us something about
what we desire (p. 43), or what we would choose. All of these remarks more strongly hint that he was
interested in a psychological claim about what we value rather than in an axiological claim about what
is valuable.17
But Feldman is here basing his interpretation of Nozick’s objection solely on the text of
Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oddly, he admits that Nozick’s ‘remarks in later writings tend to
suggest’18 the interpretation he (Feldman) finds so implausible. He notes, for example, that in
The Examined Life,
[Nozick] explicitly says that the example of the Experience Machine is intended to shed light on a
question about value. In this context [Nozick] mentions the idea that “plugging in constitutes the very
best life”.19
Feldman also concedes that ‘it is possible that when Nozick says that something ‘matters to us’
he means not just that we care about it, but that it is in fact good for us.’20
Finally, Feldman admits that the objection I have attributed to Nozick is ‘fairly interesting’,21
while the alternative interpretations of Nozick he considers are pretty clearly ‘bad arguments’.
In light of these points, not to mention my earlier observation that we can interpret Nozick’s
appeal to what we would want or choose to do if given the option of plugging in merely as an
intuition pump for (1), it seems most charitable to ascribe to Nozick the objection as I have
outlined it here.
3. Recent Criticisms of Nozick’s Objection
In this section, I will explain and brief ly discuss the most important recent criticisms of Nozick’s
objection.© 2016 The Author(s)
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Experience Machine 1393.1. A REASONABLE FEAR OF CATASTROPHE
A common criticism of Nozick’s objection is that, while it is true that most of us would not want
or choose to plug in to the experience machine, the most straightforward explanation of this fact
is one that is entirely consistent with hedonism – namely, that we would fear, quite reasonably,
that the machine might malfunction, that the premises on which it is kept might be overrun by
fundamentalist zealots, that the scientists running the machine might turn evil, etc. If any of
these things were to happen, then plugging in would be very bad for us indeed, whatever theory
of well-being were true (including hedonism).22
However, as I claimed above, Nozick’s appeal to what we would want or choose to do if given
the option of plugging in seems to function merely as an intuition pump for (1). It is a dispens-
able part of the objection. We can ignore the question of whether we would want or choose to
plug in, and instead ask directly whether it seems best for someone – either oneself, a loved one, or a
complete stranger – to plug in (or to have plugged in) in a case where the machine, as a matter of fact,
does not malfunction, the premises are not overrun by fundamentalist zealots, the scientists do not turn evil,
etc. Most people who ask themselves this latter question find themselves answering ‘no’ to it.233.2. AN IRRATIONAL FEAR, REVULSION, OR BIAS
A second criticism of Nozick’s objection is that our unwillingness to plug in might be due, not
to a reasonable fear of catastrophe, but to an irrational fear, revulsion, or bias. Perhaps we’d refuse
to plug in because we’d be too scared of having wires inserted into our skull (just as wemight be
scared of a spider we know to be venomless and so harmless), or because we’d ‘feel icky’ at the
thought of being submerged in a vat of liquid, or because – as quite a few philosophers have
suggested recently – we have a status quo bias, an irrational tendency to prefer the way things
are now to new or different ways.24
As evidence for this latter (‘status quo bias’) explanation, it has been suggested that we
consider a variant on Nozick’s case in which we are told that we are already plugged in to an
experience machine. Ask yourself: Would you want to unplug? Many people say ‘no’.25 This
is supposed to show that inNozick’s original case, it might not be our picking up on the intrinsic
value for us of contact with reality that explains our reluctance to plug in, but merely our having
an irrational impulse to stick with what we already have or know.
These criticisms, however, also seem to mistake the function of Nozick’s appeal to what we
would want or choose to do if offered the chance to plug in. Nozick could gladly accept that an
important part of the reason we would be unwilling to plug in is that we have an irrational fear,
revulsion, or bias – that we find the thought of plugging in too scary, icky, or alien. His gripe
with hedonism stands: it does not seem best for someone to plug in to the machine.3.3. THE DIFFICULTY OF HAVING A FINE-GRAINED INTUITION
A third criticism of Nozick’s objection is that it is very hard, or perhaps even impossible, when
imagining the case, to have an intuition that is strictly about well-being (i.e., about whether it
would be best for someone to plug in).26
If someone were to plug in, then this would likely be very bad for this person’s friends and
loved ones, since they would be deprived of her company. Consequently, it may be morally
wrong for this person to plug in, or best simpliciter that she not do so – things that might entail
that she hasmost reason not to plug in (whether or not it would be best for her to plug in). Perhaps
we are implicitly aware of these things when imagining the case, and our awareness of them
makes it hard or impossible for us to have an intuition that is strictly about well-being. While© 2016 The Author(s)
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140 Experience Machinewemay think that it is (1) we are finding intuitive, it might instead be something else – say, that a
normal human adult would have most reason not to plug in.
Nozick himself was aware of this worry. This is why he suggested that in imagining the case,
it might help to imagine also that other people
can also plug in to have the experiences they want, so there’s no need to stay unplugged to serve them.
(Ignore problems such as who will service the machines if everyone plugs in.).27
While the matter is hardly resolved, most commentators seem to share Nozick’s view that we
can have an intuition that is strictly about well-being.283.4. DEBUNKING THE INTUITION
A fourth criticism of Nozick’s objection is that, while (1) is indeed intuitive, this intuition is itself
best explained, not as a response to or ref lection of reality, but in a way that makes clear that it is
not truth-tracking. When we understand where this intuition comes from, we will see that it
should be ignored.
One possibility, for example, is that this intuition is the product of an irrational fear, revulsion,
or bias. (Note the difference between this possibility and the earlier-mentioned possibility that
our wanting or choosing not to plug in might be due to an irrational fear, revulsion, or bias.) Why
do we feel that it would not be best for someone to plug in? Perhaps it is because we find the
prospect of plugging in scary, repulsive, or alien, and our emotional response here is clouding or
contaminating our intuition concerning well-being.
Another possibility is that our well-being intuition is being contaminated, not by an irratio-
nal fear, revulsion, or bias, but by our intuitions or judgments concerning other matters, such
as the intuition or judgment that it would be morally wrong for one to plug in, that it would
not be best simpliciter that one plug in, that one would have most reason not to plug in, that a
life plugged in to the machine would be meaningless, aesthetically poor, low in achievement
value, etc.29
A further possibility is suggested by Matthew Silverstein.30 According to Silverstein, ‘[o]ur
[well-being] intuitions tend to ref lect our desires and preferences’, and we have been condi-
tioned to have a strong ‘desire to remain connected to the real world, to track reality’.31 Why
have we been conditioned to have this desire? Roughly, it is because having this desire tends
to lead one to happiness, and desires that tend to lead one to happiness thereby get stronger.
At the same time, desires that tend to lead one away from happiness thereby get weaker,
and the desire for happiness itself is among these latter desires. Over time, then, our desire
for happiness itself gets weaker, and along with it (since our intuitions ref lect our desires)
our pro-hedonism intuitions.
Roger Crisp suggests a further explanation of the intuition that (1) is true. He says that
wanting or caring about authenticity in relationships would likely have boosted the reproduc-
tive fitness of early humans. He writes:
Valuing honesty, transparency, genuineness, and so on, has a clear pay-off: it fends off deception, and
thereby assists understanding of the world, which itself issues in a clear evolutionary advantage.32
Moreover, feeling or judging that accomplishment mattered in itself would likely have made
one a better hunter during the Stone Age, and so resulted in one’s being ‘rewarded by [one’s]
fellows, partly with a larger share of the available goods, but also with esteem and status within
the group’.33© 2016 The Author(s)
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who survived and reproduced so effectively, in part, by happening to have these sort of non-
hedonistic dispositions and beliefs.
These criticisms of Nozick’s objection merit serious consideration. In the remainder of this
section, I want to raise three important challenges for them. First, it would be helpful if these
authors were to explain exactly what the process is by which our well-being intuitions are
affected by the desires, values, dispositions, or beliefs in question. Suppose Silverstein is right that
we are likely to arrive at a powerful desire for contact with reality via the processes he describes.
How does this desire in turn lead to our having a pre-theoretical feeling that contact with reality
is intrinsically good, not only for oneself, but for people more generally? Or suppose Crisp is right
that valuing authenticity, or wanting to really achieve things (as opposed merely to enjoying the
fruit of one’s achievements), tended to boost the fitness of early humans. How does this valuing
or desiring lead one in turn to feel (again, at a pre-theoretical level) that authenticity and accom-
plishment are good for those who possess them? What is the process?
Second, it would be helpful if these authors were to explain what intuitions are not contam-
inated in the ways they describe. Presumably, we need to rely on some well-being intuitions in
theorizing about well-being. Which ones? If Silverstein is correct that our well-being intuitions
tend to come from our desires or preferences, are there any such intuitions that do not? If so,
which ones? Alternatively, are there any basic desires that are themselves responses to or ref lec-
tions of reality? Silverstein seems to think that the desire for pleasure or happiness may be one
such desire, but his argument for this claim is underdeveloped – it would be nice to hear more
on this.34 If Crisp is right that we can ignore well-being intuitions that we have only because it
was fitness-enhancing for our ancestors to have certain dispositions or beliefs, are there any
intuitions that do not fall into this category? Which ones?
Third, there seem be some people who find (1) intuitive but who do not have any of the
desires, values, beliefs, and dispositions these authors cite. I, for example, find (1) highly intui-
tive, but I doubt very much whether I intrinsically want contact with reality, or value authen-
ticity and accomplishment in the ways Crisp mentions. How, then, did I, and others like me,
come to find (1) intuitive?3.5. DISPUTING (2)
While most critics of Nozick’s argument have focused on the status of the intuition that (1) is
true, there is a different route available: dispute (2). Hedonism might not entail that plugging
in would be best for someone. Hedonismmight, in other words, be consistent with its not being
best for one to plug in.
One hedonist, Feldman, has suggested a version of hedonism that would deliver this result.
On Feldman’s truth-adjusted hedonism, the amount that a given pleasure adds to its subject’s
well-being depends on whether it is taken in something true.35 Pleasures taken in true things
add more to well-being than otherwise identical pleasures taken in false things. Most pleasures
that are experienced in Nozick’s machine would be taken in false things – one would think
one was succeeding in one’s career, living with the most amazing partner, traveling the world,
and so on, when none of this would really be happening. Therefore, according to truth-
adjusted hedonism, these pleasures might add less to well-being than similar pleasures that
were experienced in the real world.
A second possibility is that (2) is false because one could not survive plugging in. Plugging in,
after all, would not give one any pleasures if it resulted in one’s death. Nozick himself says that
plugging in constitutes ‘a kind of suicide’, and of somebody plugged in to the machine, ‘there is
no way he is’.36© 2016 The Author(s)
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would have to erase one’s memory of choosing to plug in, and this form of mental tampering
might interrupt one’s psychological continuity in such a way that one’s consciousness would
come to an end and be replaced with a numerically distinct one.
But this suggestion, quite apart from its radical claim that the form of mental tampering in
question would literally kill one, seems unable to explain why being plugged in by somebody else,
without one’s knowledge (say, while asleep) would still seem not best for one. If I am plugged in
without my knowledge, there is no need for the machine to tamper with any of my memories.
A third possibility is that, while plugging in might not kill one, there are certain pleasures that
no machine like Nozick’s could give one. For example, the pleasures of autonomy or free action
may require the actual exercise of free will, something that is impossible in the machine (perhaps
the machine can give one at best the impression of acting freely – a pale imitation of the
real thing).
But presumably, the machine could be set up in such a way that it works, not by merely
playing one a video tape of a life, as it were – including the false appearance not only of having
various options, but also of choosing freely among them – but by improving one’s apparent
options (i.e., one’s options as they appear to one). If the machine were set up in this latter
way, it would still be required that one choose among various options. So, one would still be
capable of exercising a kind of free will, and so (even if the pleasures of free action require
the actual exercise of free will) have access to the associated pleasures.
Another suggestion is that the machine could not give one the full range of the pleasures of
love and friendship. People often say that an important reason they would not plug in to the
machine is that it would involve permanent separation from their friends and loved ones.
Nozick himself writes:
…we want a connection to actuality that we also share with other people. One of the distressing things
about the experience machine, as described, is that you are alone in your particular illusion. (Is it more
distressing that the others do not share your “world” or that you are cut off from the one they do share?)37
Perhaps the reason permanent separation from one’s friends and loved ones would be so bad for
one is that it would necessarily have experiential consequences for one. The pleasures of love and
friendship may require a certain subtlety in the language, facial expressions, bodily gestures, and
actions of those around one that is beyond the capability of AIs (or at least AIs that fall short of
real conscious selves – the sort that would populate Nozick’s machine).38
A general problem for this third account of why hedonism is consistent with (1) is that, what-
ever pleasures one would be unable to get in the machine (whether of free action, love and
friendship, etc.), these pleasures would have to be so very valuable for one that their absence
could not possibly be compensated for by the very many pleasures that one surely could get in
the machine.
4. The Desire-based Theorist’s Explanation
Many who claim that Nozick’s machine refutes hedonism accept some form of desire-based
theory of well-being – i.e., the theory on which lives can be good or bad for their subjects just
in virtue of their ability to get (and fail to get) what they want. According to these philosophers,
while hedonism cannot account for why plugging in would not be best for one, desire-based
theories can. This is because most of us want contact with reality – or, at least, real accomplish-
ment, real friendship, etc. – and plugging in would frustrate these desires.
As I noted earlier, Nozick himself explicitly considered and rejected this account of why
plugging in would not be best for one. According to Nozick, the reason we would want© 2016 The Author(s)
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for us. The reason that plugging in would not be best for us is not that it would deprive us of
things that we want, but that it would deprive us of things that we shouldwant even if we do not.
Nozick’s opinion aside, it is worth questioning the adequacy of the desire-based theorist’s ex-
planation. One reason for thinking it inadequate is that seemingly not everyone has an intrinsic
desire for contact with reality (or for things such as real accomplishment, real friendship, etc.),
yet intuitively, even those who lack such desires would still be missing out on something by
plugging in.When we encounter those rare individuals who say they would not mind plugging
in, or would even welcome the opportunity to do so, we tend not to feel ‘Ohwell, plugging in
would be best for them.’ Instead, we tend to feel that these people are making some kind of
mistake – and not simply because they do not properly understand their own preferences
(whether actual or idealized).39
In light of both Nozick’s opinion of the matter and the serious worry I have just mentioned
for the desire-based theorist’s explanation, it may be more accurate for philosophers to start
thinking of Nozick’s experience machine as an objection, not to hedonism in particular, but
to hedonism and desire-based theories taken collectively.
5. Conclusion
In this article, I have had three main goals: First, to reconstruct Nozick’s objection. Second, to
explain and brief ly discuss themost important recent criticisms that have beenmade of it. Third,
to question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of
hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.Acknowledgements
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